in the West · The War Between the Eco-Freaks and the Techno-Twits» Those who think poverty causes population growth favor direct economic aid, jobs, capital investment. My son in the military does not keep any connection with me. the links between population, poverty, and economic growth and serves Rachel explains that while this relationship is important there are. Downloadable! A discussion is presented on demographic transition that was successfully completed by developed countries, whereas developing countries are.
The reduction in the ratio of youthful dependents to working-age adults should enable countries to increase their stocks of physical and human capital schools and well-trained teachers, health care facilities and well-trained health workers, and modern communications networks and well-trained workers to staff them.
However, opening a demographic window of opportunity does not guarantee a surge in economic growth. For one thing, it is temporary, because low fertility will eventually increase the proportion of another dependent group—the population made up of older people who are no longer working. The intensity of the age-structure effect depends on the speed with which the transition to low fertility takes place.
It also depends on countries' pursuing sound economic and social policies, to enable the large wave of potential workers to acquire skills and find productive employment.
When this happens, as it did in countries like South Korea and Taiwan, a temporary surge in the accumulation of physical and human capital contributes to a rapid rise in living standards. Research on the effects of rapid fertility decline in Latin America raises some cautionary signs.
A Review of the Relationship between Poverty, Population Growth, and Environment
Economic growth has been slower in Latin America than it was in East Asia in the s, in part because of the failure of countries in this region to invest as much in education, especially for the poor. Moreover, economic policies in these countries were less conducive to the creation of productive employment for the working-age population. Similar policy failures in South Asia raise the prospect that India and Bangladesh, which are now moving into the later stages of their transitions to low fertility, may not benefit at all from the favorable demographic conditions created by those transitions.
The demographic window of opportunity is a one-time and relatively brief phenomenon around two decades, depending on the speed of the transition9 and it would be a sad irony if the successful efforts of countries to achieve lower population growth failed to reduce poverty because their accompanying economic policies were misguided or were instituted too late.
High Fertility, Rapid Growth and Poverty Although the concerns of early neo-Malthusians that high fertility actually inhibits the efforts of poor countries to reduce poverty were discounted by many economists, 10 recent studies have supported their argument. Comparisons of poor countries that experienced rapid fertility decline with those that did not find that high fertility increases absolute levels of poverty both by retarding economic growth which reduces the possibility of growth-induced poverty reduction and by worsening the distribution of additional income created by economic growth.
This may be one reason why simple cross-national comparisons of links between fertility and poverty levels fail to reveal much of a correlation. Economists point out that global food production has exceeded population growth for several decades, and that food scarcity and malnutrition depend more on agricultural and trade policies and on poor people's ability to buy food than on rates of population growth.
Interestingly, a recent report on the global food outlook agrees with both of these points, but also notes that malnutrition in poor countries would be substantially lower if population growth in those countries were closer to the low variant than to the medium variant of United Nations population projections. Family Size and Household-Level Poverty Recognizing that demographics have a dual impact on poverty both on overall growth and on improvements in living standards for the poorest families raises the question of whether high fertility is an obstacle to poverty reduction within households.
For example, children in large families perform less well in school and less well on intelligence tests than do children from small families.
Population and Poverty: New Views on an Old Controversy
When economic class is controlled for, the correlation is approximately halved, but remains significantly negative. Furthermore, large family size seems to inhibit the physical development of children, possibly through lower-quality maternity care and poorer nutrition.
Finally, links between family size and measures of parental welfare are less clear and vary over the life cycle; effects on the mother's allocation of time among childrear-ing, market work and leisure depend on the compatibility of work opportunities with child care.
High parity increases women's exposure to the risk of maternal death over the reproductive life cycle. As was mentioned earlier, economists have been quick to point out that correlation does not imply causality and that causality could run in the opposite direction. The failure to recognize that the linkage between poverty and high fertility operates in both directions was one of the major shortcomings of early neo-Malthusians.
More recent research on fertility determinants has brought a more balanced recognition of the interplay of supply and demand for children and the role of family planning in relation to other proximate determinants of fertility, such as age at marriage, as countries went through the transition from high fertility to low fertility.
Despite the extensive literature on the effects of educational status on reproductive behavior, the positive impact on educational attainment that accrues when couples are able to control the number and timing of their births has received less attention.
In research on the effects of Thailand's rapid fertility decline, demographers who examined this issue found that reduced fertility enabled families to invest more per child and thereby to educate each child better.
The effects were observed at later stages of Thailand's fertility transition and in a context in which the costs of education were borne mainly by children's parents rather than by the state. This point was emphasized in a four-country analysis of the effects of excess fertility, unintended births and children's education.
In Kenya and Egypt, however, no such effect appeared. The study in the latter two countries looked at conditions prevailing at an earlier stage of the transition to low fertility, when the costs of educating children were largely assumed by the state and did not fall directly on the parents. These researchers conclude by pointing to a "virtuous circle" linking mothers and their children.
The children of women who are able to avoid unintended or excess fertility benefit through better education; as adults, they will be better equipped to manage their own fertility and will do a better job of providing an education for the next generation. This point echoes an earlier researcher's conclusions about positive links between fertility decline and poverty reduction at the societal level: Helping women to avoid excess or unwanted fertility helps them, their children and the society in which they live.
New research has also broadened the scope of inquiry into the links between household demographics and welfare, with particular focus on factors affecting gender relations in society and within households.
A Review of the Relationship between Poverty, Population Growth, and Environment
These studies reveal an interplay of forces far more complex than the links between family size and welfare outcomes. Such research points to a number of reasons why parental expectations about the benefits and costs of rearing another child may not be realized or could lead to a reduction rather than an improvement in their own and their children's well-being.
The disadvantaged position of poor women is evident in special tabulations prepared for the World Bank on two indicators from the Demographic and Health Surveys—using a contraceptive method, and having a trained birth attendant present at the time of delivery. The overall proportion of deliveries by a skilled attendant was higher in Africa than in South Asia, but both had very large differentials by poverty status.
South Asia had a higher average level of contraceptive use than Africa, and the gap between rich and poor was less than for having a skilled birth attendant.
One reason that the rich-poor gap is smaller for contraceptive use than for the presence of a skilled attendant at delivery is that family planning is less dependent on health infrastructure, particularly in countries like Bangladesh, where the family planning outreach effort is vigorous.
Political will may also play a role in the difference between the two reproductive health indicators, because organizational obstacles to training and deploying skilled birth attendants are in principle as manageable as the obstacles that family planning organizers had to overcome in launching outreach programs. In addition, it is hoped that poor people can be helped to avoid making reproductive decisions that, while seeming to be in their best interest, do not in fact improve their well-being or that of their families.
Researchers have identified a number of such policy directions. Countries can learn from the experience of East Asian nations that realized such gains. Moreover, public policymakers should start by undoing existing policy-induced distortions for example, in limitations on the private provision of services that undercut countries' capacities to realize the positive benefits of lower fertility and to avoid the negative effects of high fertility.
Economic policies that may prevent poor women and their families from realizing the positive health and welfare benefits of safely controlling the number and spacing of pregnancies also must be revised. Developing countries must give greater emphasis to eliminating or reducing gender inequality. Moreover, to be effective, program interventions must selectively address specific needs: Microenterprise and credit programs targeted at poor women can be designed and implemented in ways that enhance their synergistic effects, by ensuring that women have control over the money they earn and that their information and education networks reach beyond the traditional boundaries and restrictions faced by poor women.
An evaluation of one such program in Malawi found that it had directly improved women's reproductive health outcomes and had indirectly improved their status in the family, through its woman-focused educational, credit and employment initiatives.
Family planning alone will not necessarily reduce poverty in developing countries, but neither will many of the present models of economic development. On the other hand, a slower rate of population growth, combined with sound and equitable economic development and the reduction of gender inequality, appears increasingly likely to achieve that goal. While fertility decisions are a private matter, there is a role for public policy. In an increasing number of countries, public and private providers are enabling women to choose when and how many children they will have, by providing information and safe, effective means of fertility regulation.
In cases where the health system fails to do this or when there is an imbalance between the individual and the social costs of reproductive behaviors, public policy needs to address these failures by improving the information and regulatory environment.
Additionally, when cost is an obstacle to effective fertility regulation by poor women, subsidizing services may be an appropriate approach.
In sum, fertility and family planning do matter for poverty reduction—for poor households and for poor countries. They are not the only, or even the most important, factors in poverty reduction. The topic has been a controversial one, and critics have reacted to statements that exaggerate the links between fertility and poverty by minimizing or denying them.
Thus, it is important that policymakers understand the new evidence supporting the view that lower fertility does contribute to poverty reduction, and that public policies that help poor people better manage their reproductive lives have societal as well as individual benefits.
It is the most populous country in the world more than one billion people and so has an inordinate impact on overall trends in the developing world. World Bank; and New York: Oxford University Press,Table 1. Those who think poverty causes population growth favor direct economic aid, jobs, capital investment.
Take care of development, they say, and the birth rate will take care of itself. Advocates of both sides have come to the village of Manupur in the province of Punjab in north India to prove themselves right. There is nothing special about Manupur.
It is a typical Indian village, with a population in of aboutmostly farmers.Poverty causes population or Population causes poverty
Its people are not well off, though their lives are slowly improving. New seeds, fertilizers, and credit systems have caused wheat yields to quadruple since They visited all homes regularly, took a census, registered all births and deaths. They also instructed people about modern methods of birth control and handed out free contraceptives.
The Harvard team expected that the birth rate would fall. The Punjabis were rural, poor and uneducated. They had an average of seven children per family. Many young people migrated to the city to find jobs; the ones who stayed inherited smaller and smaller plots of land.
Surely if families knew how to prevent having so many children, they would have fewer.
Poverty Causes Population Growth Causes Poverty - The Donella Meadows Project
The people of Manupur politely accepted the contraceptive foams and jellies. At the beginning of the Harvard study their birth rate was about 40 babies per people per year. Six years later the birth rate had gone down a little, to But the birth rate had also gone down all over the Punjab, even where there were no family planning programs. The Harvard researchers concluded that the villagers were not so ignorant after all. Family size had always been controlled with crude methods such as abstinence and self-induced abortion.
Increasing prosperity caused people to want smaller families, because there was less need for children to work in the fields or support parents in their old age. Once that happened, birth rates went down. Modern contraceptives helped them go down more easily and quickly.
Its birth rate had continued to decline slowly, to 35 per