The Pragmatics of Naming in Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa
Course Description: How can a rewarding relationship be based on manipulation .. in the Civil Rights era and enduring structures of racial difference and inequality. Turn of the Screw (ISBN ); Joseph Conrad, The Secret Sharer (ISBN English – Studies in Fiction: Love and Danger in the Classic Novel. La Clarissa de Samuel Richardson thématise le nom et le processus de la The name, just like rumor and money, circulates and is exchanged. 7 Henry Fielding, The History of the Adventures of Joseph Andrews and His . 12Mr. Harlowe's restrictedly linguistic understanding of marriage clashes Du même auteur. Start studying Enduring Love: Quotes/Themes/Language. Joe and Clarissa find comfort in retelling the accident to each other and friends . "As I went out into the hallway, back towards the answering machine, I thought, I'm in a relationship".
Norris English — Studies in Romantic Literature: Frankenstein Redux Pre Course Description: In the summer of Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley wrote Frankenstein: Itwas a hit in its own time. But it faded into relative obscurity — at least in the academy. Frankenstein would rarely if ever be found on Romantic lit syllabi until the mid s when feminist theorists resuscitated Frankenstein and many other texts written by women in the nineteenth century.
Soon Frankenstein was on many syllabi. Byten out of fifteen students in a Northwestern first-year seminar on the novel had read Frankenstein in high school. In this class we will study this trajectory. As we read and analyze the criticism over time, as well as other primary works that are contemporary with or pay homage to Frankenstein, together we will theorize about why this is so.
Writing assignments will build incrementally toward a final research paper. All students will need to have a copy of the edition Frankenstein. There was also an edition. As long as it is an edition, any published edition will do, used or new, borrowed or owned. Frankenstein is also available electronically. Almost all other required readings will be available electronically through our Canvas site.
English — Studies in Victorian Literature: The concept of evolution enthralled Victorian writers, who understood and probed that concept in a variety of ways, many of them more poetic and philosophical than scientific. What is the nature of instinct? Are children fated to be like their parents? What is the relationship between scientific and poetic conceptions of fate?
Is character written in stone or alterable? All these questions animate the brilliant novels of Thomas Hardy, and as well continue to dominate our contemporary thinking about change, fate, and character. We will also consider the ways in which psychoanalytic and linguistic theories of the mind—also founded on the model of archaeological levels—offer alternatives to evolutionary theories.
Norris Bookstore, though students are encouraged to acquire their texts independently and beforehand. English — Studies in African American Literature: Our inquiries will center on the sometimes-dueling allegiances many African American artists felt to the U.
How did expatriating empower others to reflect anew on American life, politics, and literary forms? Was it possible for authors to escape their American-ness abroad? Did Paris live up to the hype? We will debate national and canonical boundaries, questioning what defines African American literature and authorship in this particularly transnational literary movement.
Close-reading posts; 2 short essays pages ; participation and attendance. I will occasionally assign critical or theoretical works in addition to our primary literary texts. Norris bookstore Instructor Bio: English — Studies in 20th Century Literature: What possibilities did queer people imagine for how their lives could turn out, with no firmly established vocabularies or role models available? To investigate the sexual and gendered contours of this period, in this course we will explore how authors in the early twentieth century tackled these and related questions in literature, grappling with the political and social challenges and possibilities of the time.
The seminar is organized around key sites of literary production — London, New York, and Paris — and the writers who resided in them, thus taking part in new cross-cultural experiments and innovations in literature, art, and film during a period of political and social unrest not unlike our own. Participation, short reading responses, in-class presentation, and a final paper.
Also a selection of poetry, short stories, and other writing by authors including E. Todd Nordgren specializes in British and American modernist literature and culture, queer and feminist theories, life writing, and genre studies. At Northwestern, he has designed and taught courses on poetry and poetics, modernist fiction, and life writing in minority communities. His recent work includes a forthcoming chapter in the Routledge Companion to Queer Theory and Modernism on the intersections of autobiography and celebrity culture in the early 20th century.
English — Studies in African Literature: This course uses interdisciplinary and intersectional methods to study the representations of race in African literatures from different linguistic and racial backgrounds. The role of translation inter-lingual and cultural in the depiction of race will be central to our discussions.
We will read texts originally written in Arabic, English, French, and Portuguese and indigenous African languages to examine how writers come to terms with the idea of race. Who is an African and who is not?
Is race biological or socially constructed? How are non-black races e. Arabs, white, Indians etc. How does racism intersect with other forms of oppression in African societies?
How are internal racisms represented in African contexts? How are representations of race in canonical writing e. Performing both distant and close readings of African writers, we will read primary texts in terms of the techniques individual artists use to treat race matters. Interactive lectures, debates, role-play, one-on-one meetings, and small group discussions.
Two 6-page papers, weekly Canvas postings, regular self-evaluation, peer critiques, class participation, take-home exam, pop quizzes ungradedand 1-minute papers ungraded.
English — American Poetry: Nineteenth-century American poetry has frequently been reduced to the study of two poets--Whitman and Dickinson--who stand apart from the rest by virtue of their eccentricity and extraordinary ambition. This selective account of poetic inheritance has produced the unusual circumstance of a canon that needs to be opened not only to culturally marginal but also to culturally dominant poets and poetic forms.
This course integrates the study of Whitman and Dickinson with the study of a vastly expanded canon of American poetry. The course also reads theoretical and critical texts that raise questions about canonization and the formation of literary historical narratives. In its attention to the historical and cultural contexts that poetry variously inscribes and defers, the course repeatedly returns to the oscillation that that word always-already enacts in relation to the texts that lie within it.
Mandatory attendance and active, informed participation. No exams, but possible quizzes. English — Topics in Combined Studies: Revolution Post Course Description: How have revolutions shaped the modern world? How have artists, writers, historians, and musicians participated in, memorialized, and critiqued revolutionary movements?
This course will take a comparative approach to the study of the modern revolution, beginning with the Mexican and Russian revolutions of the early twentieth century, then moving back in time to the American, Haitian, and French revolutions. Drawing from a variety of humanities disciplines, we will seek to understand how revolutionary movements begin, the contingencies of revolutionary action, and what happens when revolutions become institutionalized into state apparatuses.
Enduring Love by Ian McEwan, read by David Threlfall | ANZ LitLovers LitBlog
This small-enrollment, discussion-based seminar will travel to Mexico City the week before fall quarter begins Sept to visit a variety of sites associated with the Mexican Revolution. Course enrollment is by application only.
Three essays and an exit interview. Alan Knight, The Mexican Revolution: James, Black Jacobins Note: This course is combined with Humanities Theories of Comedy Post Course Description: Since its origin in Greek civic festivals, comedy essentially a performative form has been at the center of philosophical debate. In this course, we will survey major variants of comic theory from the Western tradition and examine instances of comedy, farce, humor, laughter, satire, parody, jesting, and jokes in their historical contexts.
We will also consider what constitutes the butt of comedy and how twentieth-century theories of democracy and twenty-first-century theories of inclusivity—from the standpoints of gender, ethnicity, race, and disability—respond to the long history of laughter and the concept of resolvability.
Short papers, midterm exam, analytical close readings.
Other texts on Canvas. Radical Spirits Post Course Description: Recent scholarship on the history of abolitionism has placed renewed emphasis on the importance of religious communities within the early antislavery movement of the eighteenth century. Together, we will explore how the concerns of these religious traditions carry forward into the larger national projects of American abolitionism in the nineteenth century.
How does renewed attention to this early period help us bring into focus the contributions of radical Black abolitionists? How do the shifting concerns of these various communities and coalitions compete or collaborate? For Windham and others of his ilk, the economic price of abolition outstrips any moral returns. What right has any body of men, however numerous. Constituting the private virtues of the abolitionists as public vices, the earl designates humanitarian concern as a sentimental indulgence rather than a question of ethical obligation or political right.
The only rights the earl wishes to discuss are the West Indian property rights abrogated by abolition. One anonymous proslavery pamphlet, for example, reconstitutes the property or attribute of humanity claimed by the abolitionists as a form of literal owned property: Our present store of humanity, I doubt, is little enough for home-consumption; we ought to consider, if we run ourselves out, that, although we may open our ports for it, as we sometimes do for American wheat, yet it might not come in quantity and quality sufficient for all our purposes, neither for them nor any of our neighbours.
Therefore as long as we can use our own humanity with propriety amongst ourselves, notwithstanding it is a perishing commodity, I hope we shall have no occasion to seek abroad for it; and I trust it will be more prudent in the mean time to lay an embargo on rather than export it to a losing market. In this zero-sum economy, there is only so much humanity to go around.
Yet to treat humanity as a scarce, easily exhausted resource is to draw its very essence into question. Is humanity truly humanity if only neighbors need apply? What happens to values such as equality or liberty if they are restricted to a select group?
While the proslavery lobby argues that nearby ills should trump distant suffering—the abolitionists should clean up their own backyard before turning their eyes abroad—the antislavery speakers argue that the local and partial application of universal principles undermines their legitimacy.
Are then the offices of humanity and functions of justice to be circumscribed by geographical boundaries? Nevertheless, his effort to ground the rights of man in humanity, rather than, say, citizenship or a common relation to God, is undermined by its sentimental origins, for the definition of humanity derived from human pity binds humanity to suffering, which is of course by no means the unique province of humans.
It may come one day to be recognized, that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum, are reasons equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. For this emphasis on suffering—a quality shared by human and animal alike—at times undermines claims about the essential humanity of the enslaved, because it leads to a blurring of the very distinction between slave and brute that abolitionists sought to assert elsewhere in the debates.
If the merchandize were totally inanimate, no honest man could support a trade founded upon such principles of injustice.
Humanity without Feathers
For if we began with an additive definition of man—featherlessness, two-leggedness, rationality, speech—the sentimental quest for this lowest common denominator of humanity increasingly works us toward a subtractive definition that leaves as its remainder poor, bare, forked creatures, necessitous beings, capable only of suffering. The humanitarian precept that beneath, behind, or before allegiances, nationality, ethnicity, or race, lies the human thus proves to be deeply problematic.
Because of the way humanity is defined, that is, the recognition of humanity carries with it no entitlements or political prerogatives: It is true, Wilberforce acknowledges, that slaves had the same feelings, and even stronger affections than our own; but their minds were uninformed, and their moral characters were altogether debased. Men, in this state, were almost incapacitated for the reception of civil rights.
The first return of life after a swoon, was commonly a convulsion, dangerous, at once, to the party himself, and to all around him. Such, in the case of the Slaves, Mr. Wilberforce feared might be the consequence of a sudden communication of civil rights.
This was a feeling it would be dangerous to impart. You must conduct them to the situation in question. To be under the protection of law was, in fact, to be a freeman. To offer beatitudinous relief to the slave—to feed the hungry and clothe the naked—is to restore humanity but also to withhold the political powers ostensibly asserted through rights.
When rights appear empty or worthless, of no use, you do the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes. You give them to the poor. Those rights that appear to be useless in their place are sent abroad, along with medicine and clothes, to people deprived of medicine, clothes and rights.
It is in this way, as the result of this process, that the Rights of Man become the rights of those who have no rights, the rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman repression and inhuman conditions of existence.
They become humanitarian rights, the rights of those who cannot enact them, the victims of the absolute denial of right. Stripped of everything, the rightless can only be restored by proxy: The sentimental construction of the disempowered both performs and licenses the act of substitution on which this right to humanitarian interference is based. Sentimental humanitarianism cannot deliver rights because it can only imagine the bestowal of rights in the form of a gift to be given to subjects when they are deemed readyan element to be eventually superadded to a being whose primary mode is suffering.
Inasmuch as one cannot declare rights for another, that is, the ventriloquizing structure of the sentimental traps the slave in a structure of grief that cannot be converted to grievance, of complaint than never leads to vindication. The sentimental enabled and impelled eighteenth-century readers to envision modes of action that might eliminate or attenuate suffering, even across great distances.
That said, recent claims that have sought to conjoin the habits of sympathy inculcated in sentimental texts to the emergence of human rights overstate the case in asserting that sentimental identification engenders a belief in political equality or even human commonality. Sentimentality produces hierarchy and difference as much as it creates reciprocity and likeness. All else being equal, the death of the guilty is closer to justice than the death of the innocent.
Would one say that he who would make me a slave is not guilty, that he exercises his rights? Why does he mention Clarissa at all? At first glance, it is tempting to say that Raynal uses Clarissa as a kind of sympathetic warm-up exercise, limbering up the reader for the greater imaginative stretch of identifying with the slave, but in fact, the initial identification with Clarissa is not only refused but condemned: Clarissa is wrong to threaten self-slaughter, and the narrator explicitly distances himself, and by extension the reader, from Clarissa.
Pitting self-preservation against the sixth commandment thou shalt not killRaynal authorizes revolt not as a right but as a duty devoirand in the process, he makes the discomfiting suggestion that suffering innocents who depend upon pity, benevolence, and mercy may need force to uphold their claims to justice.
The passage from Raynal potentially offers a way to traverse the gulf between man and citizen, between those who have no rights who are only human and those who have them who are also citizens. The slave and Clarissa alike are relegated to the domain of the nonperson; both are barred from the political life and rights of the citizen.
They both nevertheless manage to exploit the border separating bare life and political life.
That Raynal couches a passage about the possibility of justice and equity in a series of mediated comparisons—of the narrator to Clarissa and of both to the slave; of one form of reasoning and another; of relative duties and rights—allows the passage to enact the failure of the promise of equity.
The reciprocity Raynal celebrates in this passage is not the sympathetic exchange of feeling but the symmetry of vengeance. In the passage, even irrevocable acts do not produce definitive forms: I conclude with this passage because it suggests that the political potential of the sentimental may not reside in its elevation of suffering others to the status of the human but rather in the ways sympathetic identification with the place of another may produce a different vision of political action.
The history of humanitarian sensibility is only one aspect of the history of this period, and the sentimental strain is only one aspect of that history. And sentimental figures, as the passage from Raynal suggests, are not the monopoly of the privileged elite but may be conscripted to quite different ends by the exploited, the disenfranchised, or the enslaved.
Yet for all its shortcomings, the patterns of thought and the habits of sympathy inculcated by the sentimental help to produce a belief in the possibility of individual and collective acts to produce change and in the necessity of creating forms of shared accountability that—with or without humanity—enable our imaginative reach to extend beyond our intellectual grasp.
Definition of the thing, or real definition. The history of the abolition is too extensive to summarize in a note.
British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective Oxford: Routledge, ; the essays collected in Thomas Bender, ed. Stanford University Press, ; J. Oldfield, Popular Politics and British Antislavery: A History New York: Norton, For Laqueur, not only humanitarian attention to life—the suffering of living creatures—but also acts of remembering the dead of war and disaster prove to be bound up in modern human rights: The Mobilization of Empathy, ed.
Richard Ashby Wilson and Richard D. Cambridge University Press,38, Peter Packard, Am I not a Man? Through their theory of marriage, the Harlowes expound a politics of the name that distinguishes between male and female heirs, the latter being arguably less well served than the former.
Thus, while Clarissa is to be condemned to a forced wedding, her family is willing to sacrifice itself to the making of a name: The only male heir, encumbered with two sisters, James Jr. The name is nothing other than a form of symbolic capital, 19 an inherited good whose value can be increased through careful management before it is passed on from one generation to the next.
Along with landed property, the name passes from father to son while the daughters are given away. Perry brings to light the dynamics of wealth at Harlowe Place: Her marriage with Solmes can be understood, as Anna Howe suggests, as an indirect and rather hazardous way for her family to reappropriate the land her grandfather gave away in his will. The veto she opposes is categorical: Refusing to write her name for her father, the name-giver, prompts a paroxystic crisis: For the marriage to be valid, Clarissa must thus recognize her new name by the apposition of her signature: The written word seems in this context to take precedence over the spoken one: Her resistance anchors itself in the necessity of the autonymous, in the demand that she name herself.
Solmes will be under an engagement if you should require it of him as a favour after the ceremony is passed, and Lovelace's hopes thereby utterly extinguished, to leave you at your father's, and return to his own house every evening, until you are brought to a full sense of your duty, and consent to acknowledge your change of name. She flees both the prospect of an odious name and a stasis of the narrative.
It is nevertheless confirmed by a r It is both as a child orphaned of her name, unbaptized, and as a just that Clarissa is granted access here. Thus doing, as M. Ragussis underlines, Clarissa inverses traditional narrative patterns: Not only does Clarissa not marry either Lovelace or Solmes, she is also abused by the fictions of the name before she is herself forced into using borrowed names to cover her erring tracks: A hostage of speech, the patronym does not circulate any more than words do: Nomination and communication, two processes at work in the writing of the novel, are diegetically problematized through the forced marriage theme.
It is one the great paradoxes of the novel that Lovelace should rescue the narrative from its doom as communication and the flow of the narrative will require the subversion of the name by the rake. Anna Laetitia Barbauld London: Her right to rename is arbitrary, its process autocratic.
She claims it as such. In a gesture reminiscent of Lovelace, which Richardson will not fail to underline, Lady Bradshaigh has just renamed her correspondent with the simple modification of the tag that identifies his painted portrait so people cannot find out she is exchanging letters with a writer of fiction.
She forces the signifier to undergo a mutation that nothing legitimates or authorizes, neither the power of the law nor that of the writer. Richardson admits himself incapable of doing anything about it: I am satisfied, Madam, with what you say about changing of names. Lovelace was a great name-changer. He represents, as Arabella underlines, a threat to the name that Clarissa has been elevating by her good works. A footnote from the editor makes his words explicit: To the name he can neither pronounce nor swallow, Lovelace wishes to simply substitute his own.
Are we to understand that he wishes to marry Clarissa? What is the nature of this operation on the name? How does one become a name-maker? Where does one learn the trade of making names? What does one do with it? Ragussis underlines the dynamics of the name in literature by generalizing what may constitute Lovelace knows how do things with words: He hurries to communicate it to his correspondent so that his letters can reach him. The borrowed name is not usurped but rather invented to be a cover.
Interestingly, it both disguises and reveals at the same time. Far from being arbitrary, the name is partly motivated. It must be acknowledged that Lovelace does not abuse this prerogative: Constrained by her fugitive condition, Clarissa will change names much more often but use disguise very seldom.
In both cases, the changing of the name is associated with a kind of day-dreaming. A legalist, Lord M.
- Analyse the breakdown of the relationship between Joe and Clarissa in Enduring Love by Ian McEwan.
The first boy shall take my surname by act of parliament. The desire of assimilation of the name is to be explained, as far as Lord M. In both cases, it is the male who is called upon to change his name—and not the female. The bourgeois Harlowes have to be satisfied with an alliance contracted through marriage. The sway they hold over the naming process is one of their instruments of control. If he does not abuse the changing of names, as mentioned above, he is the only character empowered to rename topography according to his wishes The place one cannot name has no existence.
Conversely, a place only exists through its name. Naming Dover Street enables Lovelace to shut Clarissa into a fiction without her being aware of it while preventing her being located in this liminal space: The novel becomes a prison, its communications doomed to wander and err endlessly.